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Executive Summary
We propose a rigorous modelingframework for characterizing thestructural
ability of organizations to respondquickly and effectively tounanticipated events. As such, we seek to providea theoretical basis for improved crisisman- agement strategies. Our frameworkconceptualizes organizations as adaptive,
responsive networks. Most of the existingmodels of complex social networks
to date, however, have not explicitlymodeled human capacity constraintsor system congestion. As a result,no viable frameworks exist for investigating
the responsiveness of variousorganizational structures under crisis conditions.
Our approach proposes to integratethe social network approachto modeling
communication and collaboration with the flownetwork approach frompro- duction systems modeling torepresent task processing and flow undercrisis conditions. By providing analyticstructure to decision making enviromnents
currently viewed as not amenable to formalmethods, this research,we hope, will help improve the performanceof various organizations in both theprivate and public sectors.
I.Introduction
Crises are an increasinglycommon feature of modern life. The Munich
Olympics, Tylenol tampering,Exxon Valdez, Lockerbie, AsianCur-
rency Crisis, Ford Explorer rollovers, September11, Northeast blackout,
Enron, Worldcom, Indian Oceantsunami, Hurricane Katrinahardlya day goes by withoutsome sort of crisis in the news. Ofcourse, this is partly media marketingtragedygenerates better ratings than tri-
umph. But there is no questionthat the crises are real andinvolve
enormous consequences in human life, financialcosts, environmental
impacts, and social disruption.As a result, effective crisismanagement
is a challenge that eventually facesmost leaders of public and private
organizations.Diermeier, Hopp, and Iravani
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While natural disasters or terroristattacks are most likely to capture
the imagination of the readingand viewing public, crisis management
has a much wider scope.Public sector examples range fromblack-outs
or the collapse ofcritical infra-structure componentssuch as water sup-
ply or 911 call systems,to the performance ofpublic services ranging
from hospitals, .e.g., in the caseof pandemics1 to police andfire depart-
ments, and to the military.
Unfortunately, while routine day-to-daymanagement has been sup-
ported by a steadily systematizedbody of knowledge, consistingof eco-
nomic theory, statistical tools,operational models, behavioral science,
and results from other disciplines,crisis management remainslargely
anecdotal and ad hoc. As a result, textbooks and academic courses on
the subject are almost exclusively casebased and practitioners rely on
benchmarking, checklists, and contingencyplans. While cases are valu-
able for building initial insights,they can only go so far in helpingto
prepare for future eventsthat never fully duplicate the past.Similarly,
benchmarks and checklists can help oneorganization borrow ideas
from one another, but cannot create newinsights.
This leaves contingency planning,which is by far the most common
approach for preparing an organization tomanage a crisis. For exam-
ple, most police, fire, and emergencymedical systems now have plans
for responding to attacksinvolving explosive devices andbiological
agents. The EPA has a planfor responding to an emergencycaused by
the release of hazardoussubstances. Emergency rooms havespecified
protocols for handling specific categoriesof emergencies, such as chem-
ical agent hazards, and airlinesand oil companies have specific proto-
cols for responding to crashesand spills. Moreover, since 9/11, many
corporations have hired ChiefSecurity Officers, for whom contingency
planning is a major responsibility.
A contingency plan is areasonable preparation tool for situations
in which enough of the future canbe foreseen to facilitate aplan. For
example, in 2004, FEMA ran a simulationof a fictional Hurricane Pam
that predicted the consequencesof Hurricane Katrina withdisturbing
accuracy. Tragically, manyof the preparations indicatedby the Pam
exercise were never made andthe response to Katrina was widelycriti-
cized. However, even the flawedcontingency planning may havedone
some good; theactual death toll of around 1,400fell far short of the Pam
prediction of 60,000.
But contingency planning isoften impossible or impractical.What
reasonable fire department wouldhave had a plan for managingtheInnovating under PressureTowardsa Science of Crisis Management 127
aftermath of planes crashinginto the World Trade Center? Could
NASA have drawn upan advance plan for the specific circumstances
of Apollo 13? Can we truly faulta Danish dairy company for failing
to prepare contingency plans fora dramatic drop in sales triggered by
series of cartoons in a newspaper?Should we expectan emergency
room to be prepared to be taken hostage bya frustrated father demand-
ing a heart transplant for hisson? Admittedly, this last scenariois the
plot of a Denzel Washingtonmovie, but is it really any strangeror more
shocking than the real crises citedhere? The simple fact is that despite
an organization's best efforts thereare infinitely many scenarios for cri-
ses and so it is impossible toprepare in advance for them all.
An instructive example is thepreparation of the Tulane University
Hospital and Clinic for HurricaneKatrina (Naik 2005). Incontrast to
many other hospitals, this facility,run by HCA Inc., had extensively
studied the specific challenges facedby hospitals in hurricanes and
incorporated the insights into crisispreparation and contingency plan-
ning. For example, HCA providedsatellite phones and back-upgenera-
tors and stored large quantities ofhospital supplies. Despite extensive
planning, management had tomake bold decisions underextreme time
pressure. For example, when the levees collapsed,senior management
quickly decided on an evacuationstrategy leasing a motley collection
of about 20 privately held helicoptersfor the evacuation of patientsand
staff, ranging froma privately owned Blackhawk toa Russian made
helicopter leased froman owner in Panama City, FL. To make theair-
lifts possible even at nighta make-shift landing zone was created, illu-
minated by car headlights. Moreover,management created an ad hoc
air traffic control system usingamateur ham-radio operators.
Sheffi (2005) (and Fink (2002) beforehim) used the ubiquitous 2x2
matrix format, which we summarizein figure 5.1 to characterizeorga-
nizational risks and to classifystrategies for mitigating them.
The main insight from thisrepresentation is that preparing foremer-
gency situations cannot be done witha "one size fits all" strategy. For
events with sufficiently high likelihood ofoccurrence, it makes sense to
build in redundanciesor other forms of proactive protection. Forexam-
ple, supply chains may hold safetystock or build in safety lead time
as protection against weather related shipmentdelays or disruptions.
Astronauts now carry material withwhich to repair damaged tileson
the Space Shuttle. Emergencyrooms have various specialists available
on call to handle types of medical emergenciesthat exceed the capabili-
ties of the on-site staff.Diermeier, Hopp, and havarii
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But it is not economical or evenfeasible to carry redundancies for
unlikely events. Holding safetystock to protect against a fourmonth
disruption in supply resultingfrom a plant being hit by lightning, or
keeping a tropical diseasespecialist on call to handle unusual emer-
gency room cases,would be prohibitively expensive.So for these less
likely, but still predictable, scenarios werely on contingency planning.
For instance, a manufacturermight maintain a list of backupsuppliers
to contact in case of adisruption. An emergency roommight have a
network of specialists to consultabout rare medical cases.
For truly rare but highlyconsequential situations, such asproduct
tampering scenarios, attacks onsupply chains, unusual medical emer-
gencies, catastrophic missionfailures, and many others we fall toimag-
ine until they occur, there is noalternative to crisis management.The
key question is how to ensurethat such management is awell-orches-
trated, highly creative success(Apollo 13) rather than an uncoordi-
nated, ineffectual mess (Katrina).
The main thesis of this essay isthat organizations can bepredisposed
for success in crisis situationsby both promoting individualskills and
structuring collaborative relationships.That is, instead of preparing
an organizationfor specific scenarios, as is done incontingency plan-
ning, we feel it is possible tohelp it prepare for anything bycultivating
an ability to respondquickly and adaptively to unfamiliarsituations.
Moreover, we believe that it isfeasible to establish formal metricsof
responsiveness and adaptabilitythat can be used to assess an organiza-
tion's crisis management capabilities.Following this line of reasoning,
crisis responsiveness isconceptualized as an organization'sability to
find solutions to unanticipated eventsin high-pressure situations. InInnovating under Pressure_Towardsa Science of Crisis Management 129
this sense it constitutesa specific form of innovation, but underintense
time pressure and withvery high stakes. The goal then isto develop a
formal framework thatcan help identify why certainorganizations are
better at finding solutions thanothers.
At this point the readermay ask what exactly distinguishescrisis
management from other forms ofmanagement. Perhaps crisis manage-
ment is simply management underparticularly high stakes, butnot a
qualitatively different phenomenonand therefore may not deservea
research strategy distinct fromthe general study ofmanagement. Even
if crisis management requiresrapid innovation, it could still beviewed
as a special case of innovationmanagement.
However, even a casualobservation of crisis behaviorsuggests that the existingmanagement literature is ill-suited to studycrisis manage-
ment. Much of the modernmanagement literature focuses on contracts,
compensation, and other forms ofincentive systems. Yet, it is highly
implausible that the excellentperformance of New York City'semer-
gency rescue personnel after 9/11was due to well-chosen incentive
schemes or that their performancecould have been further enhancedby
modifying incentive schemes. Thesame argument applies to observed
differences in performanceamong military units with thesame pay
structure. These casual observationssuggest that the standard tool-kit
of economic analysis(principal-agent theory, theory ofcontracts, etc.),
at least prima facie, offers littlepromise for the study of crisismanage-
ment. We, therefore, need to lookelsewhere for a suitable framework.
Developing the needed modelswill require a representation ofhow
organizations develop innovativesolutions and share knowledgeto
solve problems. This isa question that has drawn intenseinterest from
both researchers andpractitioners in recent years. Accordingto Kogut
and Zander (1992),organizations function as "socialcommunities in
which individual and socialexpertise is transformed intoeconomically
useful products and services bythe application ofa set of higher-order
organizing principles." In suchcommunities, social connectionsamong
individuals form a network throughwhich people share informationin
order to complete tasks andcreate new knowledge.
In industry, some largecompanies, including IBM, HP,and Intel, have begun makinguse of a special form of knowledgenetworks,
called Communities of Practice(CoP). Promoting learningamong
members of CoPs has enabledIBM to greatly "decreasethe learning
curve of new employees, respondmore rapidly to customer needs and
inquiries, reduce rework andspawn new ideas for products andser-Diermeier, Hopp, and Iravani
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vices" (Lesser and Storck 2001).HP has made use of similarmethods to
implement knowledge managementthrough what they call knowledge
communities (Huberman andHogg 1995). Intel hasinstalled and nur-
tured knowledge networks toexpand their access to universityfaculty
experts and thereby improvethe productivity of corporateR&D activi-
ties (Chesbrough 2003).
The modeling strategypursued in this essay utilizesthe theory of
complex social networks. Theidea here is to formallymodel organiza-
tions as knowledgenetworks as suggested byresearchers from various
disciplines who have started toexplore knowledge and socialnetworks
and their effects onorganizational performance (e.g.,Albrecht and Ropp
1984; Stevenson and Gilly1991; Wasserman and Faust1994) and orga-
nizational innovations (e.g., Burt2004; Feldman 1999;Kilduff and Tsai
2003; Kogut 2000; Mongeand Contractor 2003). Thiswork has concen-
trated on the role of node positionin the knowledge network(e.g., Burt
2004), strength of ties (e.g.,Granovettér 1973), and networkevolution
(e.g., Fonbrun 1986; Brass1995). Knowledge managementscholars have
also examined the relationbetween informal networksand innovation.
Growing interest in usingnetworks to study social systemsrecently
has attracted physicaland mathematical scientists toadapt models of
physical networks to social andorganizational networks. In the next
section we give a briefoverview on how suchmodels can be used to
model knowledge creationand sharing in organizations.
II.Knowledge Networks
A network is a systemof nodes with connectinglinks. The modern
theory of complex networks washeavily influenced by sociologyand
social psychology (e.g., Milgram1967), which also provided someof
the key terminology such as"small world" networks "sixdegrees of
separation" or "cliques." Marriedwith applications from biologyand
the suitably mOdifiedmathematics of random networks,these ideas
gave birth to thetheory of complex networks(e.g., Watts and Strogatz
1998; Watts 1999; Newman,Strogatz, and Watts 2001;Albert et al. 1999).
Once one adopts thisviewpoint, networks werefound in many dif-
ferent domains (e.g., Barabasi2002). Individuals exchanginge-mails is
one example. PersonA sends an e-mail to B; if Breplies, A and B are
connected. Other clear-cut examples arethe Internet, a network of serv-
ers, and theWorld Wide Web, a networkof web pages connected by
hyperlinks (Albert et al. 1999).Depending on the applicationsnetworks
can be modeled asdirected or undirected.Innovating under PressureTowardsa Science of Crisis Management 131
What makes networks "complex"is a surprising similarityto the
literature of critical phenomena(e.g., Stanley 1999). Realnetworks,
whether capturing social,economic, or biological systems,appear to
exhibit universal properties thatare independent of the specific form
of the interactions. Moreover,these similarities can be describedby the
same mathematical formalismas used in the study of critical phenom-
ena (e.g., Albert et al. 1999).
A recurrent characteristic ofreal networks is the small-worldphe-
nomenon, which is defined by theco-existence of two apparently
incompatible conditions, (1) thenumber of intermediaries between
any pair of nodes in the network isquite small and (2) the large local
"cliquishness" or redundancy ofthe networki.e., the largeoverlap
of the circles of neighbors oftwo network neighbors. The latterprop-
erty is typical of ordered lattices,while the former is typical ofrandom graphs.
Recently, Watts and Strogatz(1998) proposeda minimal model for
the emergence of the small-worldphenomenon in simple networks.In
their model, small-worldnetworks emerge as the result ofrandomly
rewiring a fractionp of the links in a d-dimensional lattice. Theparam-
eter p enables one to continuouslyinterpolate between the two limiting
cases of a regular lattice (p= 0) and a random graph (p= 1).
A more general questionprompted by these results is: howtypi-
cal are small world regimes?A formal representation of thisquestion
corresponds to whether the small-worldproperty emerges for finite
values of p when N approachesinfinity (e.g., Barthelmyet al. 1999).
Numerical results and theoreticalarguments show that theemergence of the small-world regimeoccurs for a value of p that approacheszero
as N diverges (e.g., Barthelmy et al. 1999).The implications of this find-
ing are as follows. Considera system for which there is a finite prob-
ability p of randomconnections. It then follows thatindependently of
the value of p the network willbe in the small-world regimefor sys-
tems with size N close to i/p. Inother words, most largenetworks are
small-worlds. Importantly, in socialnetworks the agentsare likely to be
"unaware" of this factas the vast majority of them haveno long-range
connections.
An important characteristicof a graph that is not takeninto consid-
eration in the small-world modelof Watts and Strogatz is thedegree
distribution, i.e., the distributionof the number ofconnections of the
nodes in the network. TheErdos-Renyi class of randomgraphs has a
Poisson degree distribution, whilelattice-like networks haveeven more
strongly peaked distributions. Aperfectly ordered lattice, forexample,Diermeier, Hopp, and Iravani
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has a delta Dirac degreedistribution. Similarly, thesmall-world net-
works generated by the Wattsand Strogatz model also havepeaked,
single-scales degree distributions, i.e., onecan clearly identify a"typical
degree" of the nodes comprisingthe network.
Against this theoreticalbackground, Barabasi and coworkersfound
that a number of real-worldnetworks have a scale-free degreedistri-
bution with tails that decay as apower law (Albert etal. 1999; Bara-
basi 1999) as found in thetheory of critical phenomena.For example,
a social networkof movie-actor collaborations,the webpages in the
nd.edu domain, and the powergrid of Southern California,all appear
to obey distributionsthat decay in the tail as a powerlaw (Barabasi
1999). Importantly, scale-freenetworks provide extremelyefficient
communication and navigability as onecan easily reach anyother node
in the network by sendinginformation through the "hubs,"the highly-
connected nodes. Moreover,scale-free networks are robust.Their prop-
erties survive if nodes orconnections are removedrandomly. Targeted
removal of hubs, however, destroysthose beneficial properties.
Recently, researchers havestarted to address the impact ofknowl-
edge networks onorganizational performance (Nasrallahand Levitt
2001; Huberman and Hogg1995). Because problem solvingin a crisis
setting is often collaborative(e.g., think of the interactivebrainstorming
of the Apollo 13 engineers asthey crafted a return strategy),modeling
team interactions(especially if the research focus is onthe ability to find
innovative solutions) is a keycomponent of the studyof crisis manage-
ment. An importantexample is Uzzi and Spiro's (2005)empirical study
of the Broadway industry.They are interested inidentifying network
characteristics that encourageinnovation, here artistic creativityin the
musical industry. Musicals arecreated by production-specific teams
that include a producer, composer,choreographer, etc. Individuals are
linked when they collaborate on agiven musical production.Uzzi and
Spiro then study how thesecollaboration networks change overtime
and whether the amountof clustering in the networkcorrelates with
commercial or artistic success,measured by box office results,running
time, and the like. Themain finding is that thelikelihood of success
indeed correlates with the degreeof clustering. Moreover, theinfluence
is non-monotonic.Intermediate levels of clustering areassociated with
the highest likelihood ofcommercial success.
Influenced by this line of work,Guimera et al. (2005) study amodel
of team formationcharacterized by the propensitiesthat incumbents
continue to collaborate on a newproject or are matched withotherInnovating under PressureTowardsa Science of Crisis Management 133
incumbents or withnewcomers. They show that the respectivematch-
ing probabilities lead to differentnetwork topologies and, therefore,
different expected performance.The model then is appliedto various
collaboration networks from differentscientific commimjties.
An independent line of researchhas focused on the importanceof
cognitive diversity in teams (March1991; Page and Hong 2001). Page
and Hong, for example, showhow groups with diversesearch and
problem solving strategiesoutperform experts even if theaverage com-
petence of the group members is lowercompared than in homogeneous
teams. The intuition is that the combinationof diverse search strategies
is more likely to find globallyoptimal solutions. These resultsprovide
a foundation for the common practice incrisis management situations
to assemble cross-functional teams. Forexample, when Mercedes had
to manage the recall of its A-classcar in the European market in 1997,
the crisis team includednot only safety engineers, but logisticsexperts,
marketing experts and PR specialists.
From the point of view of crisismanagement these findings are impor-
tant because they suggest howorganizations can improve their ability
to find innovative solutions incrisis situations by changing thechar-
acteristics of social interaction whetherby increasing diversity mixing
newcomers with incumbents or influencingnetwork clustering. Some
insights from this researchare already incorporated intomanagement
practices (such as theuse of cross-functional teams), while otherssug-
gest new venues. For example,one of the consequences of the research
on team networks suggests that teamassignments and training policies
should incorporateconsequences for the network structure. That is,a
joint training coursemay not only improve the skills of the individual
members but it may also createnew links (or strengthen existing links)
among team members or across teams, withconsequences for the per-
formance of the crisisresponse network as a whole. These insightsare
beginning to be applied in thearea of emergency medicine, in so-called
critical care collaboratives. An exampleis the collaborative of Neonatal
Intensive Care Units lead by theUniversity of Vermont.
The application of network theoryto knowledge based systems has
provided a theoretical frameworkto study collective problem solving
and innovation. By changing theinteraction patterns wecan expect
organizations to improve their abilityto find solutions to new prob-
lems and aggregate distributedinformation more efficiently. Theexist-
ing results suggest variousmanagement or policy implications ranging
from the increaseduse of online communication to the introductionofDiermeier, Hopp, and havani
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knowledge brokerage systems andcommunities of practice. Indeed,
the models can be interpreted asmicro-foundations for such practical
solutions. Finally, as thecommunication activity caneasily be mea-
sured (either automatically orthrough surveys) managers can, atleast
in principle, monitor the progressof their organization and intervene
if necessary.
However, while the knowledgenetwork perspective may be useful
in a crisis management contextby characterizing informationsharing
and collective problem solving,they do not help us understandthe crit-
ical question of how rapidlyand reliably the organization canresolve
problems or crises.
III.A Simple Model ofCollective Problem Solving
Despite these insights' attention,knowledge network analysis isstill
in its infancy as a managementtool. Existing models are usefulfor
characterizing connectivity amongagents in an organization,but they
are not yetwell-suited to predicting impacts onsystem performance
or identifyingspecific improvement levers.One reason for this is that
knowledge-based organizationsgenerally perform two basicfunc-
tions: (1) knowledge creation,and (2) problem solving. Thecurrent
state-of-the-art knowledgenetwork modeling provides usefulinsights
into the first function,including how organizations generate,transmit
and share knowledge (see Argote2003 for an overview). But welack a
corresponding understanding ofhow knowledge basedorganizations
translate this knowledge intotangible outputs, such as timely solutions
to problems. Hence, whileknowledge networks may be useful in acri-
sis management context bycharacterizing information sharing,they do
not help us understandthe critical question of howrapidly the orga-
nization can resolve problems orcrises. To put it differently, in acrisis
context, organizations notonly need to be creative in findingsolutions
to unanticipated events,they need to do so at high speedand with high
accuracy. Such a systemwould have to satisfy variousperformance
requirements such as:
Accuracy. Agents need tocoordinate on the desiredcollective
behavior.
Speed. The desired behavior needs tobe reached in a realistic time.
Error Tolerance. Removal of agents ormistakes in processing informa-
tion should only lead to amoderate decrease in system performance.Innovating under PressureTowardsa Science of Crisis Management 135
Scalability. The resources (e.g.,time) to perform the collectivetask
should increase ata slow rate as the number of agents (andthe system
capabilities) growsmore rapidly.
A useful model to study theseissues in more detailwas suggested in
recent papers by Moreira et al. (2004aand 2004b) and then extendedby
Seaver et al. (2006). The idea isto consider networks ofagents who can
be in one of two states denoted±1. For example, the states could be
two possible solutions toa given task, and the initial state of thesystem
can be interpreted as each agent's initialbelief about which solution
is correct. The beliefs could bebased on receiving a signal thatis par-
tially correlated with thecorrect solution. Agents areconnected in a
small world network with Jc,neighbors with rewiring probabilityp.
Moreover, to capture the effectsof misunderstandings and otherforms
of miscommurtication thereis a probability 17 ofmiscommunication.
That is, with probabilityij agents perceive the state ofany connected
agent to be -1 when it is +1 and viceversa. Collective problem solv-
ing is modeled as a densityclassification task, a widely usedmeasure
of coordination and globalinformation processing (Crutchfieldand
Mitchell 1995). For a systemcomprised of units whose state isa binary
variable, the density classificationtask is completed successfully if
all units converge to thesame state and the coordinated state is identi-
cal to the majority state in theinitial configuration. In thecase of con-
vergence on the correct state the system thereforesuccessfully aggre-
gates all local information andarrives at the correct solutionto the task.
Moreira et al. (2004a) show thata simple heuristic ("do what the
majority of your neighbors do")leads to rapid and robustconvergence
to the correct state provided theinteraction structure is characterized
by moderate noise andconstitutes a small-world network.Importantly,
both conditions arenecessary for effective problem solving.Moreover,
more complicated decision-rules that workwell in the case of i= 0 and
p =0, for example, the Gacs-Kurdyumov.Levin (GKL)rule (Crutchfield
and Mitchell 1995) fail to functionwhen communication is noisyor
interaction occurs inan asynchronous fashion. Intuitively, thisimplies
that random connectionsto other members of the networknot only are
important for problem solving,but that if they exist,even extremely
simple decision heuristicscan be successful. Moreover, thesesystems
satisfy all the criteria critical forcrisis situations. They areaccurate, fast,
error tolerant, and scalable.Diermejer, Hopp, and Iravani
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Consider the following exampleadapted from Moreira et al. (2004b).
In this variant of themodel, a modular or "island"network is con-
sidered. In a modular networkN individual agents aredivided into
communities of equal size S.Then, each agent is connected tok other
agents. With probability pthe connection is directed to arandom unit
in the network and withprobability (1 p) the connection isestablished
within the unit community.The fraction of extra-community connec-
tions p controls thenetwork topology: for p = 0 onehas completely
disconnected communities, whilefor p = 1 one has a randomgraph. To
see the importanceof p consider figure 5.2.
As can be seen from thefigure, the effect of moving to asmall-world
regime is striking. Problemsolving efficiency (measured bythe percent-
age that the system convergesto the correct solutionin 2N time steps)
dramatically increases as randomconnections reach a criticalthresh-
old. Intuitively, an organizationwill be in this state if on average atleast
20 percent of each agent'scollaborative relationships areoutside their
immediate unit or work group.
An important application inthe context of public sectorapplications
is the case of multipleagencies sharing responsibilities acommon
organizational feature especially inFederalist political systems. Exam-
ples range from identifyingand controlling epidemics to emergency
response or intelligencegathering agency networks. Thisresearch not
only suggests the critical importanceof collaborative task forces(such
as joint counter-terrorismtask forces that includemembers of the FBI,
CIA, and other members ofthe intelligence community) butthe impor-
tance of facilitatingserendipitous connections acrossexisting units, as
suggested by the small-worldmodel. These can be created byinfor-
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mal means such as jointtraining or preparation workshopsor more
formalized integrations ofresponse and conm-iunicatjon networks.The
point is that for successfulcrisis management we not onlyneed to cre-
ate efficient structures for expectedscenarios, but to improve the inno-
vativeness of response networks.It follows that the main benefitfrom
a joint training exercise of state, local, andFederal law enforcement, for
example, may lie less in the developedcommon protocols than in the
resulting mutual trust thatmay make it more likely thata member of
the local policy force calls hiscounterpart at the state level.
This insight can be easilycaptured in a rule of thumb. Supposewe
measured the network of trustedrelationships, e.g, in a simplesurvey,
as follows: A has a trusted relationshipwith B if A is willing to ask B
for help in a case whereA does not know theanswer to a given prob-
lem. In our computer model(Moreira et al. 2004b)we establish a nec-
essary condition for responsiveorganizations: each individual should
have at least 20 percent of hisor her trusted relationships outside his
immediate organizational sub-unit(whether it's a group, field office,
or department). Take the FBI asan example. For a typical fieldagent 1 in 5 of all his or her trustedrelationships should be outsideof her
field office. Similarly, 1out of 5 of all trusted relationships of,e.g., an
intelligence analyst, should bemembers of other agencies. Theresearch
on knowledge networks suggests thatorganizations that have fewer
average cross-unit relationshipsare unlikely to effectively respond to
unexpected challenges.
Seaver at al. (2006) considermore general interaction structures
where agents may have variousforms of decision biases. Specifically,
they consider organizations thatmay include "conservative" or "parti-
san" agents which holda bias toward a particular state. Specifically,a
conservative agent requires a "qualified"majority of her neighbors to
convince her to change herstate. But if a conservativeagent changes
her state, it will again takea qualified majority to change thatnew
state to yet another state. "Partisan"agents, on the other hand prefera
particular state, e.g., 1. In thatcase it will take a qualified majorityto
cause the agent to change her state to +1,but only a simple majorityto
change back to 1. Ofcourse, different individuals can have different
bias strengths as measured bythe size of the qualifiedmajority neces-
sary to lead to a change of state.
Adding partisans to the model(even if they are distributedevenly
between partisans for +1or 1) dramatically decreases theperformance of the system. In thecase of conservative agents the modelyields aDiermeier, Hopp, and Iravani
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surprising conclusion. For moderatelevels of bias (for a majority of5/7
or less of theneighbors) the system not only showsremarkable levels
of efficiency, but systemperformance actually increases asthe fraction
of conservatives increases,provided the inter-agent noise levelis suf-
ficiently high. However, there is animportant trade-off with thespeed
with which a solution isreached. That is, the time to reach consensus
grows in the fractionof conservations. If the fractionis larger than 30
percent, consensus cannotbe reached in 2N time steps.
To summarize, the simplemodel of information aggregationyields
two important insights.First, once knowledgenetworks have enough
connectivity, collectiveproblem solving can be highlyaccurate, fast,
robust, and scalable. Second,these properties largely survivewhen we
consider agents with a cognitive bias("conservatives"). However, there
now is a trade-offbetween accuracy and speed.The system may even
reach higher accuracy levels,but at significantly reducedspeed.
The fact that partisanshipand conservativism behave sodifferently
is of particular importancein the current debateconcerning intelligence
failures as in the case of Iraq'slack of Weapons of MassDestruction or
the alleged failure of theintelligence agencies to "connectthe dots" in
the advance of 9/11. Theresults suggest that even modestlevels of par-
tisanship (i.e., bias towards aparticular solution) can lead todramatic
drops in system performance.
iv.Responsiveness and Adaptation
The insights from simpleknowledge works suggest the importanceof
modeling trade-offs betweendifferent performance dimensionsin more
detail. One particularly usefulrepresentation is network flowmodels
(e.g., Gordon and Newell1967; Jackson 1957) which wereoriginally cre-
ated to understand the impactsof capacity and congestion inproduc-
tion systems. They haveprovided many useful insights intobehavior
of systems ranging fromjob serial production lines tocomplex sup-
ply chains (see e.g., Altiok1997; Askin and Goldberg 2002;Hopp and
Spearman 2000). Considerableresearch has been devotedspecifically
to the problem ofpromoting flexibility and responsivenessin produc-
tion and service systems(see e.g., Degroote 1994;Wadhwa and Rao
2003 for overviews). Theinsights from this research haveplayed a role
in the evolution of practices(labeled variously as time basedcompeti-
tion, quick responsemanufacturing, flexible production1just in time,
agile manufacturing, and leanproduction) for facilitating fast,flexible
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The challenge is to combine thesetwo approaches in the context of
a crisis situation. However, at thispoint there simply is no framework
for assessing and enhancingresponsiveness in knowledgemanage-
ment contexts. To develop sucha framework to support the vastnum-
ber of public sector crisisresponse organizations, and theeven larger
number of business organizationsthat must face occasional crises,basic
research is needed to investigatethe factors that influenceresponsive-
ness of a knowledge based organization.
In the remainder of thispaper we outline a path of research aimedat
generating a more general formalismfor crisis management. Wefocus
on two issues that are essential inmanaging emergency situations: (1)
responsiveness, which represents theability of a system to perform
tasks or resolve problems quickly,and (2) adaptability, whichmeasures
the system's ability to dynamicallyadjust to changing environmental
conditions. By combining insights fromboth social networks andpro-
duction flow networks,we eventually hope to generatea new class of
models, which we call adaptiveresponse networks, that will enable
us to diagnose and improve thepreparedness of organizations. Ulti-
mately, the goal is to createa rigorous framework to support the design
and management of highlyresponsive and effective crisismanagement
organizations. At this stage sucha general framework does not yet
exist. However, wecan provide some insights in thecase of an impor-
tant sub-class of crisisresponse infra-structure: emergency callcenters.
In addition to becominga large service industry, employingroughly
3-4 million Americans andmany more internationally, call in-bound
centers provide criticalemergency services such as 911, police, ambu-
lance, fire dispatching,etc. Workforcemanagement (i.e., workforce
training and scheduling) in callcenters is a very difficult task, dueto
the high variability in callarrivals and response times,especially in
crisis situations.
While an important topic in theirown right, understanding theper-
formance of emergency callcenters also provides somemore general
insights into the designing, training,and supporting of crisis teams.As
discussed above, one importantinsight from the knowledgenetwork
literature is that how crisisteams are formed will affect thequality of
the solution. But we also knowthat in a crisis, there isn't alwaystime
to form the best teams. Even ifa search could be carried out quickly
enough, the most desirableindividuals may be unavailabledue to
an overload. For example, in the aftermathof Hurricane Katrina, the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Servicewas available to help with search-and-
rescue operations in New Orleans, butwas unable to reach someoneDiermejer, Hopp, and Iravani
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from FEMA to get instructions.So, instead of waiting forcoordinated
assignments, the Fish andWildlife team went ahead as bestthey could
and rescued some 4,000 people.
Hence, our framework mustcharacterize the tradeoff betweenspeed
and precision in assigning teams.We must also recognizethat crisis
situations are precisely whenorganizations are likely to beoverloaded
and hence, at least in the short term,team formation may beextremely
difficult. Hence, the structureshould be robust enough tofunction
when highly disrupted, butadaptable enough to return quickly to more
efficient operation as time permits.
One way to increase responsivenessof a system is to make it more
flexible. In this section we present someof our preliminary work aimed
at designing flexible systemstructures in the context ofcall centers (Ira-
vani et al. 2005, Iravani et al.2004). This can be illustrated inthe specific
case of a call center,and we show how the well-knownAverage Path
length (APL) metric of SmallWorld Networks (SWN) can beused to
capture the flexibility ofcross-training structures of call centeragents.
Managers of call centers havefound that careful attention to cross-
training of their workforce canhelp avoid lost calls and reducelong
waiting times. Cross-trainingallows labor capacity to bedynamically
reallocated in response to shifts incall volume and mix. Evenwhen
there are no apparent trends indemand, cross-training reducesthe fre-
quency with which agentsstarve for work due tointrinsic variability in
inter-arrival and service times.Effective use of cross-trained agents can
reduce caller wait timesand/or staffing requirements.
However, full cross-trainingof every agent for every call typeis very
costly and sometimes impossible(e.g., with call centers that servecli-
ents in several languages).Hence, the problem becomes oneof finding
a partial cross-trainingprogram that results in aflexible structure that
can mitigate thedisruptive effects of variability. Wehave found that the
concept of small worldnetworks discussed above can alsobe applied
to capture the flexibilityoffered by different cross-training structuresin
the form of an index that canbe used to choose an effectivestructure
from feasible alternatives.
To illustrate our methodconsider the four cross-training structures
illustrated in the following figures.
In figure 5.3, there is nocross-training, and, therefore, each agent can
only answer a single call type.Suppose that there is highvariability in
call inter-arrival times andcall service times. This mayresult in situa-



















Examples of cross-training structures ina call center.
call type B is very long, and thereforecustomers in that queue experi-
ence a long waiting time. Since Agent 1 is notcross-trained for call type
B, her available unused capacitycannot be used to help Agent 2. Hence,
in the presence of variability,some workers will occasionally be starved
for work while othersare overwhelmed, which may cause longqueue
lengths.
Additional cross-training (i.e., partialserver pooling) can alleviate
such congestion. In systems (II) and (III)Agent 1 is cross-trained to
serve calls of type B. By using this skill appropriately(for example, at142 Diermeier, Hopp, and Iravani
times when queue A is emptyand queue B has 2 or more calls), then
customers of type B will experienceless waiting time in the line. Both
structures (II) and (III) have the sametotal number of skills. Further-
more, in both (II) and(III) all agents are cross-trained for twoskills and
every call type can beanswered by two agents. However, it hasbeen
shown (see Jordan and Graves 1995)that in the presence of variability,
structure (III) is more effectivethan structure (II). One reason is thatin
(II) Agents 1 and 2 cannot help Agents3 and 4, while in (III) Agents 1
and 2 can (directly or indirectly)help Agents 3 and 4.
Figure 5.4 shows another examplein which all agents are cross-
trained for all call types, and thereforeeach agent can help every other
agent in responding to anycall type. This structure is known as com-
plete server pooling or full cross-training,and is well known to reduce
congestion (under an appropriateservice policy). Note that, while (IV)
is the best performing cross-trainingstructure, it is also the one with the
highest training and/or wage costs.
(III)
Figure 5.4
WS network representations for cross-trainingstructures.
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The above examples show howand why the addition ofa skill can
improve system performance,provided the coordination of workersis
effective. The main role of theadditional skill is to givean agent the
capability (flexibility) to help anotheragent service a particular call type
when needed. This example alsosuggests that the more ways agents
can help each other, the more effective thecross-training structure is in
improving the system performance(something we have found tousu-
ally be the case in our study of othersystems with cross-trained labor).
To characterize the flexibility ofa given cross-training structure more
generally, we turn to the network literaturediscussed above. Specifi-
cally, we use the Average shortestPath Length (APL) and the cluster
coefficient as measures of thenetwork topology. We have found the
APL to have an obvious intuitiverelationship that correspondsto
the efficiency and responsivenessof cross-training structures in call
centers.
We have developed a methodologybased on the APL metric for
converting the design ofa cross-training structure into a useful small-
world representation. This is basedon the Work-sharing (WS) Network,
which we define by letting nodesrepresent agents and arcs represent
an overlap in the skill sets of two agents.Furthermore, the length ofan
arc connecting two nodes, i andj, isthe reciprocal of the number of call
types that can be served both by Agentsi and].
For example, consider the followingnetwork representation of the
cross-training structures displayed above.
In figure 5.2, there is an undirectedarc connecting nodes i1 andj = 2 because Agents 1 and 2 in figure 5.2can both serve (i.e., help each
other in serving) at leastone common call type (A or B). In the WS net-
work in figure 5.3 there is alsoa unidirectional arc connecting node i= 1
to node]2. The reason is that, as figure 5.3shows, Agents 1 and 2 can
both help each other in servingas least one (i.e., in this case only one)
common call type B.
Note that figure 5.1 hasno link between any nodes, because the
agents are not cross-trained and thereforehave no skills incommon.
Although systems (I) and (II) haveillustrative value, our methodology
is intended for structures suchas (III) and (IV) that are connected,a
typical small-world network (Watts andStrogatz 1998). Figure 5.4 has
every pair connected, and this represents the fullycross-trained case in
which every agentcan help each other.
Given variability in the demandand/or service processes, it is clear
that the more call typesagents can help each other with (i.e.,greater144 Diermeier, Hopp, and Iravani
number of shared call types), the moreeffective the cross-training struc-
ture would be. To capturethis, we set the length of the arcbetween i
and j, arc(i,j), to be the reciprocalof the number of call types that both
Agents i and j can serve.Therefore, if Agents i and j help eachother
in more call types, the lengthof the arc(i,j), becomes smaller. Conse-
quently, the network structures withsmaller lengths between their
nodes (and thus smaller APL) willrepresent cross-training structures
in which agents can help eachother in more call types.
To appreciate the arc lengths in anetwork, again consider structures
(II) and (III) and their correspondingWS network. In figure 5.2, Agents
1 and 2 can help each other to servetwo call types, A and B.Therefore,
the length of the arc connectingnodes 1 and 2 in WS network in figure
5.2 is the reciprocal of 2, whichis 0.5. On the other hand, in figure5.3,
agents 1 and 2 can help eachother in serving only one call type,namely
type B. Hence, the lengthof the arc connecting nodes 1and 2 in WS
network in figure 5.3 is 1 (i.e., thereciprocal of 1). Similarly, in figure
5.4, there are 4 call types (call typesA, B, C, and D) which Agents1 and
2 can both serve. Therefore, infigure 5.4 the length of the arcconnecting
nodes 1 and 2 is 0.25, thereciprocal of 4.
For a graph with N nodes,computation of the APL metric requires
the calculation of the minimumdistance between every possiblepair
(i,j), denoted as Lr). Since the pathbetween node i and i has no mean-
ing in our WS network, andsince the shortest path from nodeito node
j is the same as theshortest path from node jto node i(i.e., L' Lr'),
we only need tocalculate N(N - 1)/2 shortest paths. TheAPL of a Work
Sharing network with N nodes istherefore the average length of these




Note that our SW network isdefined such that a smaller APL num-
ber generally corresponds to across-training structure in which agents
have greater versatility in helpingeach other. Thus, the smaller the
APL, the more flexible and moreeffective the cross-training structureis
in reducing the customer averagewaiting times. We call ourmethodol-
ogy based on the WSnetwork and the APL metric the WS-APLmethod.
As an illustrative example,consider a call center that receives12 dif-
ferent types of calls, which arelabeled A,B,C,... ,L. Calls of type i arrive
randomly with a rate specified byjth element of the demand rate vector
D = (0.5,0.5,0.5,0.75,0.75,0.5,1.167,0.667,0.667,0.333,0.333,0.333). SupposeInnovating under PressureTowardsa Science of Crisis Management 145
that the call center hasseven agents. We assume that call handling!
service times are stochastic withan average of 0.9 units of time (which
corresponds to a system utilization of 90percent under an aggregate
arrival rate of seven calls per unit time). Figure5.5 shows two agent
cross-training structures that are easily capable ofhandling demand
vector D, because under both structures, all calltypes receive enough
capacity.
The key question, therefore, is which cross-trainingstructure is more
flexible (i.e., will yielda smaller average customer waiting time over
a range of operating conditions that include high variabilityin call
arrival and call response time,as well as high call volumes during the
peak hour)?
The WS networks of the same structuresare presented in figure 5.6.
Although Structure 1 has more total number ofkills than does Struc-
ture 2, the WS network of Structure 2 hasa smaller APL than that of
Structure 1APL2= 1.21<APL11.63), which implies that thecross-
training of Structure 2 should bemore effective than Structure 1.
Structure I
Figure 5.5









WS network representation for cross-training structures
To see which structure actuallydoes yield the lowest average cus-
tomer waiting time, we developed adiscrete-event computer simula-
tion program and estimated the averagecustomer waiting times under
each cross-training structure. The underlyingmodel is a queuing net-
work with parallel, infinite-buffer queues.Call inter-arrival times and
call service times are modeled using Gammadistributions (which cov-
ers a wide range ofvariability scenarios with coefficients of variation
of less than, equal to, or greater than one).Over a range of variability
levels in the call arrival and service processes, aswell as the utilization
(load) of the system and peak hours,simulation reveals that Structure
2 does indeed outperform Structure 1 inminimizing the mean waiting
times. In fact, for different variabilityand utilization scenarios, Struc-
ture 2 resulted in 15.6 percent to 24.6percent (with an average of 20.2
percent) smaller waiting times than Structure 1.This is consistent with
the prediction of our WS-APL methodthat suggests Structure 1 is the
more flexible alternative.
We performed similar experiments onclose to 1,000 more cases that
include: (1) systems ranging from 6 to 10call types, (2) systems with
different levels of uncertainty in callarrival process and call response
time (i.e., we considered coefficientof variation CV = 1 and CV = 2 for
call inter-arrival and service times), (3) systemswith random shocks
where a shock significantly increases callarrival rate during a particu-
lar interval (i.e., peak hours). For detailsof our numerical study see
Iravani et al. (2005).
We found that in 90 percent of the cases in ournumerical study, the
WS-APL index was able to detect the moreflexible structure among
Structure 2
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any pair of alternative structures. In the remaining10 percent where
the APL prediction waswrong, the performance (i.e., the averagecus-
tomer waiting time) of the structure chosen bythe WS-APL index was,
on average, only 2 percent worse than that of the betterstructure. This
supports our assertion that in general, the smallerthe world of the WS
network (i.e., the smaller the APL), thebetter the performance of the
corresponding cross-training structure.
As our preliminary results show,system structure, if properly
designed, can significantly increasesystem responsiveness by mitigat-
ing the negative effects changes in theenvironment (including disrup-
tions due to routine variability and/orunpredictable shocks). This
system responsiveness can be characterizedquantitatively through the
use of network analysis.
An important next goal is to extendthis approach for measuring
structural flexibility to develop generalmetrics that characterize the
ability of an organization to respondquickly and accurately toemer-
gency situations. To do this, one will need toconsider more complex
workflows than those inan emergency call center. The task network
involved in responding toa crisis will generally involve precedence
constraints, collaborative work, and learningover time. But the same
basic underlying structure ofa network of capacity constrained agents
responding to uncertain and dynamicallyvarying workloads, is still
valid. Hence, we expect thata structural analysis in the same veinas
that described above will providepart of a general characterization of
adaptive response networks. The followingsection will outline some
ideas of how this can be accomplished.
V.Towards a General Approach
Our general goal is to understandthe impact of organizational struc-
ture on the responsiveness and effectivenessof crisis management by
developing a theory of adaptiveresponse networks. To do this, we need
to model an organization asa network in which nodes represent agents
and arcs represent potential collaborationlinks. Each agent hasspe-
cific skills (the nature of whichmay be only partially observable) and
is capacitated (so that system congestionwill cause delays in complet-
ing tasks). Arcs represent formal and/orinformal links which can be
exploited to search for information andform problem solving teams.
A "crisis" can be modeledas the random arrival of a problem, which
can be resolved by completion of a set of interrelatedtasks. The qual-148 Diermeier, Hopp, and Iravani
ity and speed of the crisis resolutionwill depend on task sequencing,
assignments of teams to tasks, andallocation of agent time to tasks. In
this modeling context, the crisis managementproblem devolves to one
of assigning agents to tasks over timein a fashion that yields a high
quality solution in a time responsive manner.One may begin by assum-
ing that the problem structure isgiven and that agent assignments are
centrally controlled and will seekinsights into the network structure
and control policy that yields the bestresults. A next step would be to
then relax the central control assumptionand assume that agents make
local decisions regarding their timeallocations and will seek further
insights into the impact of training andcommunication policies on per-
formance. Finally, one should considerthe case where the nature of the
problem is revealed over time and seek toidentify effective "act and
adapt" strategies for simultaneouslylearning about and responding to
a crisis situation.
From a structural perspective1 theparallel server structure of the
call center represents one of thesimplest possible environments. Tasks
(customers) are all single step operations.Skills are represented with
simple "on" or "off" switches. And disruptions arerestricted to fluctua-
tions in workloads. The literature onsocial networks in organizations
provides a basis for representing morecomplex problem solving envi-
ronments. For example, figure 5.7a represents a purehierarchical orga-
nization (adapted from Watts 2003,figure 9.1). Both NASA and many
emergency rooms havehierarchies like this. If this structure wereused
rigidly, for two agents to communicate,they must connect through for-
mal channels, which may require many steps.In contrast, figure 5.7b
represents a hierarchical organizationthat has adapted by evolving
Figure 5.7
(a) Pure hierarchical organization; (b)hierarchical organization with informal adaptive
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informal links that serveas communication shortcuts. Such informal
communication links can be promoted by policiesranging from office
layout (Davenport 2005) touse of formal "knowledge brokers"(Cross
and Prusak 2002).
As discussed above, facilitatingcommunication via shortcut links
has been widely studied in thecomplex networks literature (seee.g.,
Watts and Strogatz 1998). However,to our knowledge, none of this
literature has attempted to explicitlymodel task processing times and
therefore no previous modelcan predict the impact of network evolu-
tion on response times. The analysis thenshould be extended to other
collaborative structures suchas matrix organizations, team based struc-
tures, multi-agency collaborative environments,etc.
A natural extension ofa model where agent teams are assigned (or
self-assigned) to tasks, which they willcarry out as expeditiously as
their workloads will permit, would thenalso consider the possibility
of adjusting task assignmentsor team structures as the crisis evolves.
Moreover, in most crisis situations, however,conditions change dramat-
ically over time. New information becomesknown. Agents who were
either unavailable or overloaded becomeaccessible. Completion of tasks
reveals the need for other tasks. Hence, inpractice, the ability to adapt
to changing conditions is a vital crisismanagement skill. This suggests
extending the task resolution model ofcrisis management to incorpo-
rate act and adapt policies under whichagents strike a balance between
acting on their currently assigned tasks andsearching for new infor-
mation and/or collaboration opportunities. Actingimmediately on the
basis of local information speedsresponse, but spending time to search
for better solutions may ultimatelyproduce a faster good response.
The recent Hurricane Katrina experienceoffers some instances where
too much search and coordination led toresources being idled while
people were in immediate peril. Asa tragic example of the conse-
quences of too little of a search, we may consider thecase of a patient
who came into an emergencyroom exhibiting symptoms of confusion
and odd behavior. The initial agent responsiblefor the situation was the
receptionist, who had to decide whetherto have the patient wait or be
seen immediately. In this case, the receptionist calleda nurse to exam-
ine the patient, and it became her decisionto seek additional expertise
immediately or to have the patient wait. Hadthe nurse called a physi-
cian to see the patient, the physician would havehad to decide whether
to call in outside expertise. At each step, the individualexamining the
patient also had to decide how much timeto spend with the patient150 Diermeier, Hopp, and Iravani
and what steps to take. Sadly, in this caseit turned out that the patient
was suffering fromheat stroke aggravated by animpermeable weight
loss suit and the patient died in thewaiting room before being seen by
a physician. Failureof the system to respond quickly enoughhad fatal
consequences.
To extend a modeling framework toinclude adaptability, as well as
responsiveness, one should therefore:
Incorporate agent utilization as avariable in the team formation pro-
cess. A natural startingpoint is the study of flexible work systemsin
which queue length information is used todynamically allocate agents
(see e.g., Van Oyen, Senturk-Gel,and Hopp 2001). The policies from
this research offer ways to balancethe need for working on the most
pressing tasks in the short term with theneed to level agent workloads
to provide good performancein the longer term.
Incorporate information search into theadaptive response network
framework. That is extending the problemof search in complex net-
works (see e.g., Watts 2003, Chapter 9for an overview) to include mod-
els of search in the presence ofconstraints on agent capacity and/or
system congestion.
Incorporate learning into the adaptive responsenetwork frame-
work. To do this, one must model changesin the available information
(e.g., the skill level needs of aparticular task or group of tasks). We
must also consider the possibilityof new tasks for addressing the crisis
becoming available (e.g., newdevelopments occur which require atten-
tion of agents). The resultingproblem could be modeled, for example,
as a dynamic stochasticcontrol problem or involve the use of plausible
heuristics.
VI.Conclusion and Policy Implications
In this essay we suggest thatknowledge network and network flow
models offer a highly flexible, yetintegrated approach to modeling cri-
sis responsiveness and preparedness.Clearly, we are in the very early
stages of exploring thesemodeling approaches. Yet, even our very pre-
liminary results suggest that they mayprovide new insights that can
guide practitioners in designingimproved crisis management prac-
tices. Specifically, our approach suggestsat least three novel perspec-
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Rather than developingresponse strategies to more potential "con-
tingencies," or "scenarios" crisismanagement performance may be
enhanced more readily by focusingon the responsiveness of organiza-
tions: the ability to find solutions to unanticipatedproblems and tasks.
Organizations vary in their responsiveness. Butthe factors that can
account for these differences are not yet well understood.Once we con-
ceptualize organizations as networks of individualsthat need to quickly
solve an incoming flow of critical problems,we can begin to model the
performance drivers of such knowledge networkssystematically.
The insights from such modeling activitiescombined with careful
data analysis and field study will likely yieldimportant policy con-
clusions. Even our initial resultssuggest that as governmental actors
are facing an increasing number of complex andunanticipated events,
investment in inter-agency connections is likelyto yield large benefit as
long as these connections lead to trustedrelationships between mem-
bers from different agenciesor backgrounds. Indeed the benefits from
improving the interaction betweenagents may far outweigh the ben-
efits from investing in expensive individualtraining programs.
Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank Scott Stern forvaluable suggestions. All
remaining errors are our own. Financialsupport for this project was
provided by the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation.
References
Albert, R., H. Jeong, and A.-L. Barabasi. 1999. Nature 401:130-131.
Albrecht, T. L., and V. A. Ropp. 1984. "Communicatingabout Innovation in Networks of
Three U.S. Organizations." Journal of Communication 34:78-91.
Altiok, T. 1997. Performance Analysis of ManufacturingSystems. New York: Springer.
Argote, L., B. McEvily, and R. Reagans. 2003. "ManagingKnowledge in Organizations: An
Integrative Framework and Review of Current Themes."Management Science: 571-582.
Askin, R. G., and J. B. Goldberg. 2002. Design and Analysisof Lean Production Systems. New
York: John Wiley & Sons.
Barabasi, A. 2002. Linked: The New Science of Networks. NewYork: Perseus.
Barabasi, A., and R. Albert. 1999. "Emergence of Scalingin Random Networks." Science
286(15): 509-512.152 Diermeier, Hopp, and Iravani
Barthelemy, M., and L.A.N. Arnaral. 1999. "Small-WorldNetworks: Evidence for a Cross-
over Picture." Phys. Rev. Lett. 82:3180-3183.
Brass, D. 1. 1995. "A Social Network Perspective onHuman Resources Management."
Research in Personnel and Human Resources Management 13:39-79.
Burt, R. S. 2004. "Structural Holes and Good Ideas."American Journal of Sociology 110(2):
349-399.
Chesbrough, W. H. 2003. "A Better Way to Innovate." HarvardBusiness Review 81: 12-13.
Cross, R., and L. Prusak. 2002. "The People WhoMake Organizations Go - Or Stop."
Harvard Business Review 80(6): 104.
Crutchfield, J. P., and M. Mitchell. 1995. "Evolving GloballySynchronized Cellular
Automata." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences92: 10742.
Davenport, T. 2005. Thinking for a Living: How to GetBetter Performance and Results from
Knowledge Workers. Harvard Business School Press.
De Groote, X. 1994. "The Flexibility of
Management Science 40(7): 933-945.
Diermeier, D. 2005. "From Minimizing
Management with Applications to the
Mineral Law Review. Westminster, CO.
Production Processes: A General Framework.
Liability to Maximizing Opportunity - Crisis
Natural Resource Industries." Rocky Mountain
Feldman, P. M. 1999. "The New Economics of Innovation,Spillovers and Agglomeration:
A Review of Empirical Studies." Economics ofInnovation and New Technology 8: 5-25.
Fink, 5. 2002. Crisis Management: Planning for theInevitable. Lincoln, NE: iUniverse.
Fombrun, C. J. 1986. "Structural Dynamics with and betweenOrganizations." Administra-
tive Science Quarterly 31: 403-421.
Gordon, W., and G. Newell. 1967. "Closed QueueingSystems with Exponential Servers."
Operations Research 15: 254-265.
Granovetter, M. 1973. "The Strength of Weak Ties."American Journal of Sociology 78(6):
1360-1380.
Guimera, R., B. Uzzi, J. Spiro, and L. Amaral. 2005. "TeamAssembly Mechanisms Deter-
mine Collaboration Network Structure and TeamPerformance." Science 308: 697-702.
Hopp, W. J., and M. L. Spearman. 2000. FactoryPhysics: Foundations of Manufacturing Man-
agement, Second Edition. Burr Ridge, IL:McGraw-Hill.
Huberman, B. A., and T. Hogg. 1995. "Communities of Practice:Performance and Evolu-
tion." Comuputational and Mathematical OrganizationTheory 1: 3-92.
Iravani, S. M. R., B. Kolfal, and M. P. Van Oyen.2004. "Call Center Labor Cross-Training:
It's a Small World After All." Forthcoming in ManagementScience.
Iravani, S. M. R., K. Sims, and M. P. Van Oyen.2005. "Structural Flexibility: A New
Perspective on the Design of Manufacturingand Service Operations." Management Sci-
ence 51: 151-166.
Jackson, J. R. 1957. "Networks of Waiting Lines." OperationsResearch 5: 518-521.Innovating under Pressure-Towardsa Science of Crisis Management 153
Jordan, W. C., and S. C. Graves. 1995. "Principleson the Benefits of Manufacturing Pro-
cess Flexibility" Management Science 41(4): 577-594
Kilduff, M., and W. Tsai. 2003. Social Networksand Organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage Publications.
Kogut, B. 2000. "The Networkas Knowledge: Generative Rules and the Emergence of
Structure." Strategic Management Journal 21(3):405-425.
Kogut, B., and U. Zander. 1992. "Knowledge ofthe Firm, Combinative Capabilities and
the Replication of Technology." OrganizationScience 3: 383-397.
Lesser, E. L., and J. Storck. 2001. "Communities ofPractice and Organizational Perfor-
mance." IBM Systems Journal Knowledge Management40.
March, J. G. 1991. "Exploration and Exploitationin Organizational Learning." Organiza-
tion Science: 71-87.
Milgram, 5. 1967. Psychology Today 2: 60-67.
Monge, P. R., and N. Contractor. 2003. Theoriesof Communication Networks. Cambridge:
Oxford University Press.
Moreira, A., D. Diermeier, and L. Amaral. 2004a."Efficient System-Wide Coordination in
Modular Networks." Proceedings of the 2004Workshop on Social Agents: Ecology, Exchange,
and Evolution. Argonne National Laboratory.
Moreira, A., A. Mathur, D. Diermeier, and L.Amaral. 2004b. "Efficient System-Wide Coor-
dination in Noisy Environments Using HeuristicMethods." Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences, 101, 12085-12090.
Nail<, Gautam. 2005. "Planning and PrivateResources at the Hospital Giant HCA Made
Rescue Operation Possible." The Wall Street Journal(September 7): Bi.
Nasrallah, WE, and R. E. Levitt. 2001. "An interactionValue Perspective on Firms of Dif-
fering Size." Computational and MathematicalOrganization Theory (7): 113-144.
Newman, Mark, Steve Strogatz, and DuncanWatts. 2001. "Random Graphs with Arbi-
trary Degree Distributions and Their Applications."Physical Review: E 64.
Page, Scott, and Lu Hong. 2001. "Problem Solvingby Heterogeneous Agents." Journal of
Economic Theory 97: 123-163.
Seaver, S., R. D. Malingren, M. M. Moreira, M.Sales-Pardo, D. Diermeier, and L. A. N.
Arnaral. 2006. "Micro-Bias and Macro-Performance."Working Paper. Northwestern
Institute on Complex Systems, NorthwesternUniversity Evanston, IL.
Sheffi, Y. 2005. "The Resilient Enterprise:Overcoming Vulnerability for Competitive
Advantage." Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Stanley, H. E. 1999. Rev. Mod. Phys. 71, S358-S364.[Special Issue for the Centermial of the
American Physical Society.]
Stevenson, W. B., and M. C. Guy. 1991. "InformationProcessing and Problem Solving:
The Migration of Probelms through FormalPositions and Networks of Ties." Academy of
Management Journal 34: 918-928.
Uzzi, B., and J. Spiro. 2005. "Collaborationand Creativity: The Small World Problem."
American Journal of Sociology 111(2): 447-504.154 Diermeier, Hopp, and Iravani
Van Oyen, M. P., E. G. Senturk-Gel,and W. J. Hopp. 2001. "Performance Opportunityof
Workforce Agility tu Collaborative andNoncollaboratiVe Work Systems." lIE Transactions
33: 761-777.
Wadhwa, S., and K. S. Rao. 2003. "Flexibilityand Agility for Enterprise Synchronization:
Knowledge and Innovation Managementtowards Flexagility." Studies in Informatics and
Control 12(3): 111-128.
Wasserman, S., and K. Faust. 1994. SocialNetwork Analysis: Methods and Applications. Cam-
bridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Watts, D. 2003. Six Degrees: The Scienceof the Connected Age. New York: Norton
Watts, D. 1999. Small Worlds: The Dynamicsof Networks between Order and Randomness.
Princeton, NJ: University Press.
Watts, D., and S. Strogatz. 1999."Collective Dynamics of 'Small-World'Networks."
Nature 393(4): 440-442.
Watts, D. J., and S. H. Strogatz. 1998. Nature393: 440-442.